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Abstract
We explore the relationship between litigation rates and the number of lawyers, in a
typical supplier-induced demand (SID) frame. Drawing on an original panel dataset for
the 169 Italian courts of justice between 2000 and 2007, we first document that the number of lawyers is positively correlated with different measures of litigation rate. Then,
using an instrumental variables strategy we find that a 10 percent increase of lawyers
over population is associated with an increase between 1.6 to 6 percent in civil litigation
rates. Thus, our empirical analysis supports the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers:
following an increase in their relative number, lawyers may exploit their informational
advantage to induce clients to access to courts even when litigation is unnecessary or
ineffective.
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Sanctus Ivo erat Brito / Advocatus et non latro / Res miranda populo (Saint Ivo was
Breton / A lawyer and not a thief / Something hard to believe). From the inscription in
Treguier on the grave of Saint Ivo of Kremartin, patron saint of lawyers, a lawyer himself.

1

Motivation

On 30th June 2009, the day after the New York Court of Justice released the verdict to
condemn Bernie Madoff to 150 years of conviction for his financial fraud,1 Corriere della
Sera, the most read and prestigious newspaper in Italy, reported the above vignette by its
satiric columnist.2 The vignette, show in its two halves a person in front of a court. In one
half, it says: “US: six months for a 150 years sentence”; in the other, “Italy: 150 years for a
six months sentence”.
The vignette is probably the best summary we could find for the present work. Italy is
quite rarely in the top positions of international rankings. However, in few other fields it can
exhibit such an impressive collection of negative records as in the international comparisons
for the legal system and the administration of justice. Not only Italy is the European country
with the highest absolute numbers of both incoming and pending litigious civil cases into
courts; but is also one of the European countries with the longest times to dispose of cases in
first instance courts: 507 days on average for litigious civil cases (CEPEJ, 2008). It is perhaps
not too surprising that Italy is the European country with the highest number of lawyers in
absolute terms: in 2006 they were 170,143, compared to 138,104 lawyers in Germany, and
47,765 in France (CEPEJ, 2008). For instance, the city of Naples alone counted almost
the same lawyers than in all England (Consiglio Nazionale Forense, 2009; CEPEJ, 2008).
Furthermore, Italy is also the European country with the second highest number of lawyers
per 100,000 inhabitants: 290 (only second to the 342 of Greece), compared to 168 of Germany,
76 of France, 22 of United Kingdom (CEPEJ, 2008).
What is even more striking is the impressive rate at which the number of lawyers has been
increased in the last decades: according to data officially released by the agency managing the
lawyers’ pension scheme, lawyers have more than tripled in Italy, jumping from 42,366 in 1990
to 143,976 professionals in 2008 (+239.84%; Cassa Nazionale Forense, 2009). The trend is
common to many other professionals in Italy, including accountants and business consultants
(14,474 in 1992, become 48,109 in 2007, +232.38%; Cassa Nazionale di Previdenza dei Dottori
Commercialisti, 2009). However, it is striking that such a jump in the number of lawyers
occurred in a period in which the national GDP increased only by the 23.88% in real terms
(IMF, 2009).
It is also in the period 1990-2007 that the litigation rate, measured by the number of
pending proceedings have further increased: incoming proceedings increased from 524.3 per
100.000 inhabitants in 1990 to 658.8 in 2007 (+25.7%), while pending proceedings passed
from 804.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 1644.7 in 2007 (+104,4%).
The two trends in the increase in the number of lawyers and in the litigation are very
likely to be related. Figure 1 below shows the correlation between the number of lawyers
active in each court of justice and the litigation rate in that province. As it can be seen the
positive correlation is quite sharp.
1

An updated version of the infamous “Ponzi scheme”.
Emilio Giannelli, a lawyer and former Director of Legal Affairs of the third biggest Italian bank, Monte
Paschi di Siena.
2
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Figure 1: Provincial correlation between lawyers and total litigation rate (average 2000-2007)
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These recent trends have recently attracted some attention from the literature on law
and economics. Marchesi (2003) suggests that the higher litigation rate could have been
caused by the existence of long trials: in fact, long waiting times to obtain a sentence give
incentives to one of the party to breach contracts in the attempt to postpone due payments.
Marchesi (2003) also observes that at least three, out of five, actors involved in a trial may
have incentives to delay the time to obtain a sentence, namely the party that is in the wrong
and the lawyers of both parties. In Italy, in fact, lawyers are typically paid according to the
time and the number of judicial acts they are devoting to a case.
Some other studies have rather focused of the organization on the “supply” of justice
in Italy and have mostly pointed to the low productivity by judges as the main responsible
for high waiting times. Coviello et al. (2009), for instance, analyze the organization of two
sections specialized in labor disputes in the of courts of justice of Milan and Turin, and
observe that judicial offices working “in series” - that is, opening a new file only when the
previous ones have reached a sentence - appear to be significantly associated with shorter
waiting times than offices working “in parallel”.
Here we explore an alternative route. We explicitly test the hypothesis that the high
litigation rate might be caused by an “excessive” access to courts by citizens. In particular,
referring to the health economics literature, we propose an application of the supplier-induceddemand (SID) hypothesis to the case of Italian judicial system.
Under that perspective, an increase in the number of lawyers, and therefore in the density
ratio between lawyers and population, might have forced lawyers to “induce” their clients to
access more often the courts even when a judicial solution would have not been necessary or
effective. Such an opportunistic behavior by the lawyers is possible because of the asymmetric
information and imperfect agency relation between lawyers and their clients, and might be
favored by the joint effect of tougher competition, caused by the new entrants, and of uniform
minimum fees for service, required by the actual institutional context and the organization
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of legal professions in Italy. The induced, excessive demand for judicial resolution might thus
have inflated the litigation rate.
In order to test this hypothesis, we have collected data from different official sources and
built an original dataset on the 169 Italian courts of justice, considered in the period 20002007. In our OLS estimates, to mitigate for omitted variables bias we control for the number
of judges in the court, for major socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, such as the
levels of GDP, employment rate, population density, urbanization rate, education and social
capital in the province. We exploit the panel structure of our data by estimating OLS models
that allow for both province- and time-fixed effects.
Even after controlling for other determinants of litigation and for fixed effects, the number of lawyers across provinces could be correlated with the error term for several reasons.
For instance, local higher rates of civil litigation in one court could attract lawyers into that
province, which would bias our OLS estimates upward. In order to address this potential endogeneity problem, we adopt a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) approach. What is needed
is an instrument that is correlated with lawyers in the province and uncorrelated with unobserved factors that affects litigation. We consider two instrumental variables. The first is
based on the fixed coefficient approach (Freeman, 1980; Bartik, 1991; Blanchard and Katz,
1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Card, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Cortes, 2008): by considering the national levels of lawyers and lagged values of the local distribution of lawyers across
provinces, we introduce an exogenous source of variation to be used as instrument for lawyers.
The second instrument, based on the methodology proposed by Card (1993), is the average
proximity of the province to the three faculties that offer law courses enabling to become
lawyer.
Our main result is that the number of lawyers operating in a court does indeed exert
a positive and statistically significant effect on the litigation rate. A 10% increase in the
number of lawyers over population is associated with a 1.6% to 6% increase in litigation rates.
This effect is robust across several specifications and checks, both on the control variables
and the instruments. Our results thus support the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers. In
particular, our evidence supports the idea that, following an increase in their relative number,
lawyers may have taken advantage of the informational asymmetry to induce clients to access
to the courts even when litigation would have not been necessary or effective.
Our work is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main characteristics of the
organization of justice and of the legal professions in Italy. Section 3 reviews the literature
on SID in health economics and applies it to the Italian judicial system. Section 4 describes
the data and the variables. Section 5 reports the empirical strategy and the estimation
results. Section 6 concludes with an overall discussion of the results.

2
2.1

The Organization of Justice in Italy
Courts of justice and judges

The administration of justice in Italy is organized in three degrees of courts of justice, that
can be sequentially accessed. As a first level, there are 169 first instance courts of justice
(Tribunali di primo grado). In many cases they cover the same geographic areas where the
provincial administrative governments have jurisdiction. However, in several cases, especially
in Piedmont and South Italy, there is more than one court of justice for province: some cover
the most populated cities, some other follow the old jurisdictions of the former independent
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states existing before Italian unification in 1848. In 2008, a total number of 4,503 professional
judges work in the 169 first instance courts of justice (CSM, 2009), divided almost equally
between sections of the courts specialized in civil and penal justice (Sezioni civili and Sezioni
penali, respectively).3
It is interesting to notice the evolution of the number of professional judges in the Italian
first instance courts of justice: in the ten-years period 1998-2008, their number increased
by 31,74%, passing from 3,418 to 4,503 (CSM, 2009). However, such a trend has not been
monotonic. At the contrary, most the increase in the number of judges took place in 2000,
2002 and 2004, when more than 5,000 magistrates were active (CSM, 2009). That number,
however, declined in the immediately following years.4 Notice that, between 2000 and 2007,
the period considered for our estimation, the number of professional judges in the Italian first
instance courts of justice marginally declined (-3,49%) from 4,689 to 4,525.
The parties can appeal the sentence by a first instance court of justice and then access the
second instance courts of justice. There are 29 second instance, or appeal, courts of justice
(Corti d’Appello), usually one each Italian region, although the most populated regions have
two. The regional areas over which a second instance court of justice has jurisdiction are
called “districts” of appeal courts of justice (Distretti di Corte d’Appello). Finally, but only
for procedural or formal matters, the parties can also appeal the sentence by the second
instance courts of justice and then access the final degree of justice (Corte di Cassazione),
which is only in Rome. It is important to notice that the distribution of professional judges
across the three levels of justice is greatly skewed in favor of the first instance courts of
justice: for instance, of the 6,450 professional judges totally active in 2006 in all levels of
justice, as many as 4,633 worked in the first instance courts (CEPEJ, 2008; CSM, 2009).5 It
is also important to bear in mind that, according to comparative statistics, Italy is among
the European countries with the lowest number of professional judges sitting in courts per
100,000 inhabitants (11 in 2006, compared to an European average of 19.8).
To conclude the description of the organization of Italian courts of justice, we should
mention the existence of non-professional judges, and, in particular, the institution in 1995
for civil, and 2002 for penal matters, of the figure of honorary judges of peace (Giudici
di Pace): they are well respected and experienced law professionals that are temporarily
appointed as honorary judges for a (renewable) period of four years, and serve as preliminary
first instance courts for small claims such as controversies about houses, flats and gardens;
goods and services of a value up to an amount of 2,582.28 euro; vehicles for a value up to
15,493.71 euro, among others.6 There are currently 3,403 honorary judges of peace operating
3

In the larger courts of justice, typically the ones operating in the main cities where the second instance
courts of justice are, some of the civil justice sections focus on the legal matters related to labor contracts
(Giudici del lavoro). Administrative and tributary matters are instead dealt by specialized first instance courts
of justice.
4
The reason behind this periodic increase, and then contraction, of the number of judges, is mainly due to
the selection process to appoint the judges. The selection of judges is very strict and competitive: it requires
a three-stage examination of the candidates at a national level that needs approximately two years to be
concluded, and usually takes place every second year, following an official call for applications by the Ministry
of Justice. Moreover, it can be noticed that, at least since 2004 on, where magistrates were 5,040, the total
number of judges has been constantly declining (CSM, 2009). This is also reflecting the fact that, after 2004,
no further selection to appoint new magistrates has taken place.
5
Notice that this figure does not include the 2,231 (in 2006: CEPEJ, 2008) professional public prosecutors
(Procuratori della Repubblica) operating in the separate and independent sections (Procure) within the first
instance courts of justice.
6
The access to these honorary judges is much quicker, easier and cheaper for the parties than the one to
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in Italy, distributed roughly in proportion of the professional judges in each first instance
courts of justice (CEPEJ, 2008; Italian Ministry of Justice, 2009). The introduction of the
honorary judges, aiming at turn away the simpler cases and smaller claims from the ordinary
courts of justice already operating above capacity, it has been proved to be successful in
reducing the number of files still pending in front of the courts of justice and in contributing
to reduce the average time to reach a sentence.7

2.2

Cases

To test the relationship between number of lawyers and litigation rate, we will focus on the
civil cases processed by the first instance courts of justice, including the ones processed by
honorary judges of peace. The choice to focus on litigation in civil courts only is mainly
motivated by the crucial difference between civil and penal cases in the Italian justice. In
fact, while a civil case may be started by any citizen, assisted by a lawyer, and is therefore
a natural candidate to test the SID hypothesis, a penal file have to be started by a public
prosecutor, thus leaving no room for inducement by lawyers.
The natural starting point is a comparative perspective within the European countries.
Official statistics by CEPEJ (2008) gives Italy a number of international records. Considering
2006 statistics, for instance, Italy is the European country with the highest absolute number
of incoming litigious civil cases into first instance courts: 2,825,453, compared to 1,104,828
cases of Germany and 1,688,367 of France (CEPEJ, 2008). Such a massive inflow of incoming
cases, rather than an exception, is in line with the trend in the last fifteen-years period, and
clearly contributes to keep the total number of pending civil litigious cases (at the end of
2006) at 3,687,965, again the highest absolute figure in Europe (CEPEJ, 2008). Even when
such statistics are read in relative terms, the record of Italy remains greatly unchallenged:
concerning 2006 data, Italy is the European country with the second highest number (after
the Netherlands) of first instance incoming litigious civil cases per 100,000 inhabitants (4,809,
compared to 2,672 of France and 1,342 of Germany: CEPEJ, 2008).
The high and constant number of incoming civil cases and the massive stock of pending
cases have clearly an effect on the length of time necessary for a case to be disposed of by
the courts. Indeed, the statistics on the average number of days that cases are outstanding
or remain unresolved (disposition time) gives Italy some of the longest times to dispose of
cases in first instance courts: 107 days were needed in 2006 for a non-litigious civil case,
while as many as 507 days were needed for litigious civil cases, compared to 36 and 262 days,
respectively, in France (CEPEJ, 2008).8

2.3

Lawyers

The organization of lawyers in Italy closely follows the organization of the courts of justice.
Lawyers have to be enrolled in an official compulsory register (Albo professionale) that is hold
and supervised by a local professional bar association (Ordine degli avvocati ), to which the
national law gives extensive legal prerogatives. There are 169 local professional associations,
the ordinary first instance courts of justice; usually controversies are reconciled by proposing a compromise
solution for the parties; sentences are rarely appealed to the ordinary courts of justice.
7
Nevertheless official comparative statistics show that Italy is still among the European countries with the
lowest numbers of both non-professional judge per professional judge (1.1 in 2006, the fourth lowest figure)
and non-professional judges per 100.000 inhabitants (12 in 2006, the third lowest figure: CEPEJ, 2008).
8
Among European Union countries, only Cyprus and Slovenia do worse than Italy.
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one every first instance court of justice. Bar associations are formed by all lawyers enrolled in
the official register, who elect a council and a chairman (Consiglio e Presidente dell’Ordine).
The latter are legally in charge of the supervision on the official register and, more generally,
on the professional conduct of the associates. They also decide on all controversies among
lawyers, and between lawyers and their clients, and, in order to enforce their supervision
on the professional conduct of the associates, have some disciplinary powers, such as the
suspension or expulsion from the official register.
The national law also regulates the criteria needed for lawyers being eligible to enroll
into official registers. In fact, access to the legal profession in Italy requires a first degree in
law (5 years), followed by a two-year apprenticeship in a lawyers’ office (Praticantato). In
order to obtain the official qualification as lawyers, successful candidates have then to pass a
two-stage selection process, which is taking approximately one year.
Besides the local professional associations, a national council of lawyers (Consiglio Nazionale
Forense) operates at the Ministry of Justice in Rome, to decide on controversies between local associations. The main prerogative of the national council of lawyers, however, is to set,
every second year, all the payment tariffs and fees for service to be paid to lawyers, for civil,
penal, administrative and tributary cases. Such decisions by the national council are subject
to formal approval by the Ministry of Justice and are then legally binding for all lawyers and
uniform across every local registers.9
In particular, the payment scheme set by the national council show some important
features. First, unlike in other systems, contingent fees are not possible: the payment is
always due and the client must pay the amount to the lawyer regardless of the outcome
of the controversy. Secondly, the overall payment to the lawyer is directly proportional to
the amount of legal services and acts provided by the lawyers. Moreover, even though it
is possible to agree on a premium payment to the lawyer in case of a positive outcome,
payments proportional to the value of the controversy are also explicitly ruled out. Finally,
and importantly, the payment scheme as set by the national council is legally binding. In
particular, no payment can be charged below the level set by the national council of lawyers,
that thus serves as a compulsory minimum fee.10 Lawyers, however, are free, at a large
extent, to ask any higher payments than the amounts set by the national council.
Data on the number of lawyers are available from two different sources. On the one
hand, the national council of lawyers does not provide yearly data on the number of lawyers
enrolled into each local register, while these statistics are available only every two-three years.
The main reason why this source of data is scarcely reliable for an empirical investigation
does not lie in their incomplete availability, though. In fact, by their nature, the registers
from the local bar associations include all graduates in law who, at some point, got the
professional qualification as lawyers, but actually no longer work, or even have never worked,
as lawyers. This is because in Italy who got the professional qualification as a lawyer has the
right to remain in the official register regardless of whether, and how effectively, is working
as lawyer. The local registers thus include many professionals who are actually working only
9

In particular, the Ministry of Justice decree 127/2004 specifies that the payment to the lawyers (parcella)
is constituted, on the top of the reimbursement of all expenses, by two parts: the tariffs (onorari), and the
fees for services (diritti).
10
The existence of such minimum compulsory fees for legal services has been challenged by the decree
223/2006 (the so-called Bersani decree) aiming at their elimination. Although the national council of lawyers
opposed the decree and tried to limit its applicability, the decree became finally operating from 2008. This also
explains the 2000-2007 time period we have considered for our empirical estimation. The Italian Parliament
is currently debating a new law reintroducing compulsory minimum fees for lawyers’ services.
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occasionally, or have soon abandoned the profession for different career patterns.11
As the two sources of data differ, there is a discrepancy between the number of lawyers
registered to the official registers (Albo Avvocati ) and the number of those enrolled into the
professional pension scheme (Cassa Forense). In particular, the latter underestimates the
official number of lawyers.12 As empirical estimates are concerned, issues may arise only
if the difference between the two measures would change over time within provinces. Data
available show that the ratio between the two measures is approximately constant across time
within provinces. Therefore, controlling for both province- and time-fixed effects allows to
adequately deal with the potential measurement error.13
Data show that in less than 20 years, the number of lawyers enrolled in the national
pension scheme more than tripled, jumping from 42,366 professionals in 1990 to 143,976 in
2008 (+239.84%). The total number of lawyers doubled during the 90s and, between 2000 and
2007 (the period considered for our estimation), experienced an equally impressive increase
(+65.48%), from 82,637 to 136,750 professionals (Cassa Nazionale Forense, 2009).
As already mentioned, European statistics show that in 2006 Italy was the European
country with the highest absolute number of lawyers, and the highest number of lawyers
per professional judge: 26.4, compared to 7.1 of France, 6.9 of Germany and 3.2 of United
Kingdom. Italy was also the European country with the second highest number of lawyers per
100,000 inhabitants: 290 (only second to the 342 of Greece), compared to 168 of Germany,
76 of France and 22 of United Kingdom (CEPEJ, 2008).

3

The Supplier-Induced-Demand Hypothesis

Direct inspection of official statistics shows that a greater supply of lawyers went hand-in-hand
with an increased litigation rate in Italian courts of justice. For instance, in the 1990-2007
period, while the number of lawyers almost tripled, the number of files pending in front of the
first instance courts of justice increased by 104.4%. Looking at provincial level (see Figure
1), it emerges a strong correlation between the number of lawyers and the litigation rate in
the local courts, this generally holding for several definitions of litigation.
The mere fact that consumption of legal services, and therefore, litigation rate increases
with the number of lawyers, however, it is consistent with several explanations. For instance,
if the market for lawyers were competitive, then an increase in the number of lawyers should
lead to an outward shift of the market supply function. Combined with a downward-sloped
demand curve, this predicts an increase in the number of traded legal services, paired by
a fall in their fees. The effect on total expenditure is ambiguous and depends on the price
elasticity of demand. Under this perspective the higher litigation rate is simply the demand
reaction to lower fees consequent to an increase in the supply, and is therefore nothing but a
11

How serious is this issue is confirmed by the recent, fiercely debated, intention by the national council of
lawyers to exclude from the local registers any professional who is not earning from the lawyers’ activity a
minimum level of income. The statistics published in the official publication by Cassa Forense (Biancofiore,
2009; Donella, 2009) show that 47.605 lawyers enrolled in the official registers declared in 2008 no income from
the legal profession.
12
In 2008, 53,969 lawyers were enrolled into the official registers but not in the national pension scheme.
The discrepancy between the two measures appears to be specially large in southern Italian provinces. Many
possible explanations can be put forward. Since the enrollment into the pension scheme is compulsory only
from a minimum threshold of earned income, it may be more difficult for lawyers in southern Italian regions
to earn a sufficiently high income. Tax evasion may be an alternative explanation.
13
For a detailed analysis of the discrepancy between these two sources see Donella (2009)
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market adjustment.
The argument based upon this market explanation, however, cannot apply to the case
of Italian lawyers. In fact, the Italian institutional context has greatly favored a substantial
rigidity of lawyers’ fees. The main cause for lawyers’ fees failing to decline is related to the
above discussed legal privilege by the national council of lawyers to set a minimum fee for
legal service, which is binding and uniform across all Italian courts of justice.14 The existence
of such minimum fees may not only represent a lower bound for the attempts to decrease
prices, but also serve as a salient reference price for lawyers when setting their fees,15 thus
curbing price competition, as also pointed out by the Italian antitrust authority in several
occasions (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 1997, 2009).
As we will argue below, the joint presence of a compulsory minimum fee, set by the
national council of lawyers, and of a sufficiently large share of new entrants in the market
who are willing to provide legal services at the minimum fee, are conditions that makes the
above market explanation hard to believe for the case of Italian lawyers.
An explanation alternative to physiological market adjustment can in fact be found in the
peculiarities of the lawyer-client relationship. One of the key ingredient of this relationship is
the clients’ incomplete information about their true needs. Typically clients who consults a
lawyer only knows that they require some legal assistance, because, for instance, they are not
satisfied with some contractual obligation or extra-contractual relation. Typically, the client
tends to trust the better informed lawyer, to delegate to the latter the choice of the exact
legal and juridical instruments, and, more often than not, to follow the lawyer’s advices and
recommendations. Services from the legal professions, such as the ones by doctors, financial
experts or art consultants, can in fact be viewed as credence goods, in the sense of Darby
and Karni (1973): even after having used such services, due to the informational asymmetry
clients cannot verify whether professionals acted in their interests.
This remains without consequences as long as lawyers act as perfect agents for the clients,
choosing what the clients would have chosen if they had possessed all necessary legal knowledge. It does become a problem, however, as long as the lawyers’ decisions on behalf of the
clients are influenced by their own interests. Lawyers, in fact, are not merely agents but also
providers and sellers of legal services. Italian lawyers are not an exception. Indeed, interests
of lawyers and clients are potentially conflicting in two aspects.
First, following an increase in the number of lawyers, such as the one observed for Italy
in the 1992-2007 period, lawyers may have faced the threat of a strong competitive pressure
in terms of fewer clients in their portfolio. Lawyers, however, may envisage the goal to
secure their own full employment or to maintain their previous, higher, income level. This
would be consistent with the target income hypothesis by Evans (1974), originally applied to
physicians, by which professionals have a desired level of income that they strive to achieve,
or to restore, whenever actual income falls below the target. In such a case, following an
enhanced competitive pressure and a contraction in clients’ portfolio, lawyers may have been
tempted by manipulating the information provided to their clients in order to induce them
to unnecessarily access to courts. This potential source of conflict of interests is favored by
14

A similar relation has been observed in health economics literature between increased supply of physicians
and increase in utilization of health care services, in spite of non declining prices for medical services: Fuchs
(1978) observe it in US even in presence of higher fees; Adam (1983), Breyer (1984) and Breyer et al. (1986)
detect it in some German Lander where fees were fixed at a uniform rate across regions; Grytten et al. (1990)
observe it for the demand for dental services in Norway, where a national fixed price was in place.
15
For a model and some experimental evidence of the role of reference prices in coordinating pricing strategies
and favoring collusive behavior see Miraldo (2009) and Galizzi and Miraldo (2009).
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the Italian legislation by which clients cannot pay to lawyers fees contingent on the outcome
of the litigation.
Secondly, once started a case, lawyers have interest in inducing the client to request a
large number of acts and legal services. In fact, potential conflict of interests are exacerbated
by the fact that in Italy the payment scheme designed by the national council of lawyers is
not only proportional to the time and effort spent in a case, but also integrated by a plethora
of fees and tariffs for each legal act or service supplied.16
Therefore, these potential sources of conflict of interest make the agency relationship between lawyers and their clients an imperfect one, and provide to lawyers incentives to exploit
their informational advantage in their own interests, by inducing not necessary, or inefficient,
access to courts or excessive provision of legal services. Due to asymmetric information, the
demand by clients can no longer be treated as sovereign, and is, at the contrary, induced by
suppliers.
The supplier-induced-demand hypothesis in the specific case of Italian lawyers can also
be illustrated by mean of a simple graphical representation (Figure 2). Imagine that clients’
demand for legal services (L) negatively depends on the level of lawyers’ charged fees (F ).
For the sake of simplicity, suppose the initial demand function is linear in fees and can be
represented as D0 .
Figure 2: supply and demand functions with minimum fee

F

S0

F*0
D0

F

L0

L*0

L

Denote F the minimum fee for service set by the national council of lawyers. As discussed
16

Van De Voorde et al. (2001) found some indirect evidence of suppliers-induced demand in the context
of the Belgian national health system, characterized by excessive supply of doctors and by a fee-for-service
system.
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above, this level is uniform across all districts of justice and legally binding for all Italian
lawyers, in the sense that no lawyer in Italy can charge less than F for providing legal
services, while is free, at some extent, to charge fees higher than F . The supply function
of legal services by Italian lawyers can therefore be expressed as a schedule of the following
type:
• for any F < F, L = 0;
• for F = F, L is any value within [0, L0 ];
• for any F > F, L = L0 + αF ;
with α>0, and where L0 stands for the proportion of lawyers in the market that accept to
supply legal services for a fee equal to the minimum fee set by the national council.
The number L0 of lawyers working for the minimum fee can be thought as a function
of some underlying characteristics of the organization of the legal professions in Italy. For
instance, one can think to L0 as the share of young lawyers in the market. In fact, professionals
that have just gone through all the long selection process, and have recently qualified to work
as lawyers, can typically act as aggressive entrants in the market and, in order to gain
experience and build a clients’ portfolio, may therefore accept to work for fees equal to the
minimum set by the national council.17 Alternatively, one can think to L0 as reflecting
the existent competitive pressure in the provision of legal services from suppliers other than
lawyers. In Italy for instance, workers and consumers can access trade unions and consumers’
associations, respectively, in order to get legal assistance for small claims. On the other hand,
while large companies typically have internal legal offices dealing with most standard issues,
small and medium enterprises are also able to access other categories of consultants (such
as tax advisors, experts in labor and pensions issues, among others), or even consulting
services organized and provided by local chambers of commerce and branches of the business
associations they are member of.18
The supply schedule for legal services can thus be represented as a kinked, piecewise
linear, upward-sloping function with the shape represented by S0 in the figure 2. In fact,
for any fee lower than F, no legal service is provided. For fees exactly equal to the level of
the minimum fee, there is a proportion L0 of lawyers that accept to supply legal services.
The S0 function represented in figure 2, then assumes the remaining share of lawyers offer an
amount of legal services which is directly (and linearly) increasing with the charged fees, as
in a standard upward sloping supply function.
As usual, the intersection between demand and supply function provides the equilibrium
level of legal services and fees in the market. In our case these crucially depend on the initial
relative position of D0 and L0 . In fact, when the share L0 of young lawyers is relatively
low compared to the demand schedule, intersection typically occurs in correspondence of the
upward sloped piece of S0 , and the equilibrium market fee is higher than the minimum legal
fee, F0∗ > F, as in figure 2. On the other hand, when there are relatively many lawyers in the
market that accept to work for the minimum fees, equilibrium fees in the market coincide
with the minimum level set by the national council, F0∗ = F, as in figure 3
Clearly, the effects of an increase in the number of active lawyers in the Italian market,
and the likelihood of eventually support the SID hypothesis, ultimately depends on the initial
17

Despite the lack of official data, anyone can find support to this conjecture from anecdotal experience and
direct conversations with young lawyers.
18
Such as Confindustria, the Italian equivalent of the Confederation of Business Industry in United Kingdom.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium market price equal to the minimum fee
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F
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L*0
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L

market equilibrium. In fact, imagine that, following, for instance, the entry of a flow of young
professionals, an increase occurs in the level of active lawyers in the market. This can be
represented by an outward shift of the supply function from S0 to S1 : in particular, as more
young lawyers enter the market, the number of lawyers that accept to work for the minimum
fees also shifts outwards, from L0 to L1 .
The SID hypothesis assumes that, following the entry of new professionals and the shift
in the supply function, lawyers in the market would be tempted to exploit their asymmetric
advantage in order to induce their clients to demand unnecessary or ineffective legal services.
The increase in supply would thus induce also an increase in demand, possibly by a lower
extent. Graphically, the demand schedule would also shift outwards, from D0 to D1 . These
shifts would imply that, in the new market equilibrium, clients buy a larger quantity of legal
services from lawyers. Therefore, under the SID hypothesis, an increase in the number of
lawyers in the market would be typically associated to a larger access to courts of justice,
and to a higher litigation rate.
However, to find a full support to the SID hypothesis, the increase in the litigation rate
should be exclusively due to the artificially inflated demand induced by lawyers. In particular,
to fully accept the SID hypothesis, one should also rule out the possibility that the higher
litigation rate derives from a demand that physiologically increases because of a drop in the
fees. Therefore, the SID hypothesis is compatible only within some specific initial market
equilibrium. In particular, imagine that the initial share of lawyers working for the minimum
fees L0 is relatively low, and that the initial intersection with demand occurs at a point in the
upward-sloped piece of the supply function. As in figure 4, in the initial market equilibrium
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an amount L∗0 of legal services are bought at an equilibrium fee F0∗ , higher than the minimum
fees. In such a case, the induced demand by lawyers following the entry of new professionals
may not be the only explanation to an observed higher litigation rate. In fact, following a
shift from S0 to S1 due to a higher number of lawyers active in the market, and a partially
induced outwards shift in demand, the new market equilibrium implies a higher number of
traded legal services L∗1 > L∗0 , but also a lower equilibrium fee F1∗ < F0∗ . Therefore, even in
presence of some inflated demand induced by lawyers, it cannot unambiguously ruled out the
possibility that, at some extent, clients have indeed demanded more legal services because
fees have been reduced by increased competition. This, in fact, would also be compatible
with standard market adjustment.
Figure 4: Increase in supply and market adjustment
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On the other hand, imagine there are relatively many lawyers in the market that accept to
work for the minimum fees, so that intersection with demand occurs at a point in horizontal
piece of the supply function, and equilibrium fees in the market coincide with the minimum
level set by the national council. In such a case the SID hypothesis may be fully supported as
an explanation for an observed higher rate of access to courts. In fact, following the entry of
more lawyers in the market, lawyers can, through their advises to clients, artificially inflate
the demand for their services to match the higher supply, shifting demand outwards from D0
and D1. This leads to a new market equilibrium, such as the one illustrated in figure 5, in
which a larger amount of legal services is bought, L∗1 > L∗0 , even in presence of unaffected
fees for services, that remain fixed at the level of the minimum fees F .
Therefore, the SID hypothesis can be supported as a theoretical explanation for an observed increase in the litigation rate after an inflow of new lawyers into the market. In
13
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Figure 5: Increase in supply and induced demand
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particular, the SID hypothesis turns out to be a particularly convincing explanation when
there is a relatively high share of professionals who accept to provide legal services at the
minimum fees set by the national council of lawyers. This is very likely to be the case in
Italy, where, as discussed above, an extraordinarily high number of young professionals have
recently entered the market.
One can still argue that SID is not the only possible explanation accounting for the positive
correlation between the number of lawyers and the litigation rate, even in presence of not
declining fees. In particular, a typical argument that can be put forward is one based upon a
reverse direction of causality. When choosing a location for their office, in fact, young lawyers
may try to assess the areas where demand will be high enough to guarantee a sufficient level
of expected revenue. Areas and cities with high demand for the legal services should thus
attract more lawyers than those with low demand. Consequently, a high per capita utilization
of legal services leads to a high lawyers density on average, and not vice-versa, as assumed
by the SID hypothesis. This argument puts emphasis on a potentially serious endogeneity
problem, between the number of lawyers and the demand for legal services. However, applied
econometrics can deal with the endogeneity problem, for instance through the instrumental
variables two-stages technique that we employ in our estimations. Therefore, the definite
answer to such a reverse causality question is simply an empirical matter, that we address
more in detail in the next Sections.
For what concerns the literature on law and economics, to the best of our knowledge, no
study has yet directly and explicitly tested the SID hypothesis for legal services. However,
some indirect evidence in support of the SID hypothesis for lawyers has been found by
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Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) for the case of Japan, and by Sobbrio et al. (2009) in the case
of Italy.
On the other hand, among health economists interested in physicians’ incentives, a number
of studies have already attempted to empirically test the SID hypothesis. In general, several
studies have provided some evidence in support to the hypothesis. For instance, Fuchs (1978),
using cross-section data on US surgeons, found that an increase in 10% surgeon density led,
ceteris paribus, to a 3% increase in the frequency of surgery. Tussing (1983) used data from
Irish general practitioners and found that that the number of visits and the likelihood that a
visit was initiated by the physician were significantly positively correlated with the number
of physicians per population. Adam (1983), Breyer (1984) and Breyer et al. (1986) analyzed
regional German data between 1977 and 1982 and, using multi-equation models to simultaneously explain physician density and per capita expenditure in medical services, found
statistically significant elasticity of per capita expenditure to physician density (estimated
0.1-0.4 elasticity). Kraft et al. (1986) using data from a medical practice in the Canton of
Berne, Switzerland, found a statistically significant, positive, correlation between expenditure per medical case and physician density, and, after a Hausman test, concluded that the
latter was to be considered exogenous. Grytten et al. (1990) supported the SID hypothesis
for the Norwegian market for dental services, where, in a context of fixed, uniform fees, both
the demand and the expenditure for dental services increased as the population/dentist ratio
decreased. Grytten et al. (1995), using Norwegian data, found some evidence of SID for
diagnostic laboratory tests requested by doctors. Gruber and Owings (1996), analyzed data
from the US National Hospital Discharge Survey in the 1970-1982 period (on 200.000 discharges from 400 hospitals) and found evidence in favor of the SID hypothesis in the number
of Caesarian deliveries, more lucrative, and requiring a lower workload, to US obstetricians
than natural child birth deliveries. Van De Voorde et al. (2001), by estimating the effect of an
increase in co-payment rates on patients’ out-of-pocket price elasticity, indirectly found some
evidence of inducement by general practitioners in Belgium, characterized by an excessive
supply of doctors and by a physician remuneration scheme based on fees for services.19
The findings of the health economics literature are not unanimous, though. A number of
papers that tested the SID hypothesis, did not find strong evidence in support of it. Rossiter
and Wilensky (1984), for instance, found little support for the SID hypothesis from the data
on expenditure for health services by a representative sample of US population, contained in
the National Medical Data Expenditure Survey. Grytten et al. (1995) used survey data on
physician-patient contacts for a representative sample of the Norwegian population and did
not find any sign of SID on the number of physician-initiated visits, although they found some
evidence of it in the number of diagnostic laboratory tests required by physicians. Madden
et al. (2005) studied the effect of a change in the reimbursement system for Irish general
practitioners on the utilization of their services and found ambiguous evidence on SID.
The current debate in the health economics literature is mostly related to the choice of
the empirical strategy. Indeed, an accurate econometric analysis testing the SID hypothesis
should convincingly deal with the potential endogeneity and causality issues, and, ultimately,
on the selection of good instruments to be used in the instrumental variable estimation. We
will discuss our empirical methodology in the next Section.
19
The validity of the empirical results by Van De Voorde et al. (2001) has been questioned by Cockx
and Brasseur (2003), who argued that the authors’ estimated price elasticity ignored the substitution effects
induced by the change in relative prices of physician services.
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4

Data Description and Panel analysis

Our balanced panel dataset comprises annual observations for the 103 provinces over the
period from 2000 to 2007.20 Data regarding civil proceedings and lawyers are collected at
the level of courts of justice and then aggregated at the level of the 103 Italian provinces.21
Civil litigation data come from the civil justice statistics recorded by the courts of justice.
These statistics are published yearly by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and allow
a disaggregation by province and type of litigation. In particular, we distinguish among
different forms of litigation: first-instance ordinary civil proceedings in front of civil courts of
justice (courts of justice); first-instance ordinary civil proceedings in front of honorary judges
of peace (judges of peace); total litigation rate, given by the sum of the previous two (total
litigation rate); and litigation for compensation (compensation).
The main explanatory variable is the number of lawyers over population at provincial level
(lawyers). As discussed above, we use the total number of lawyers enrolled in the pension
scheme, divided by local professional register, as obtained by Cassa Forense, the agency
managing the lawyers’ pension scheme. In order to control for the lawyers-judges ratio and
for a proxy of productivity in each court, we add as explanatory variable the numbers of
judges over population at provincial level in each year (judges).
Our dataset also includes a set of socioeconomic and demographic variables that are
likely to be correlated with litigation rates. Demographic variables include the population
density in the province (density), and the concentration index (concentration), calculated
as the ratio between the population residing in the provincial administrative city over the
population in the rest of the provincial area. We include these variables as in more densely
populated areas the number of social interactions and, thus, the potential conflicts and dispute
are greater. Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include the (log of) real GDP per
capita, (GDP per capita), and the employment rate, (employment), which measure the size
and development of provincial economy, both of which have been proved to be potentially
correlated to the litigation rate (Posner, 1997; Hanssen, 1999; Clemenz and Gugler, 2000;
Ginsburg and Hoetker, 2006).
It may be argued that also the level of education of the population may affect the level of
civil litigation, although the direction of such an effect seems more ambiguous. In fact, on the
one hand, better educated population may also be more aware of their rights and, possibly,
more inclined to pursue their rights by accessing the courts. On the other hand, better
educated population may also be more aware of alternative ways of dispute resolution, or
more informed about the high costs and long time horizons necessary to conclude a dispute
in courts, and therefore, more discouraged to access courts of justice. In order to check
the effect and, if any, the direction of education on litigation, we include the percentage of
population with high school diploma as a proxy for education (high school ).
Finally, the level of civil litigation may be affected by the level of social capital in the
province. For instance a higher level of social capital may reduce civil litigation since individuals are more respectful of contracts and laws and also because may favour an informal
resolution of civil disputes. Following Buonanno et al. (2009) we include, as a measure of
social capital, the density of associations (associations), namely the number of recreational,
20

The choice of the period considered for our empirical estimation is motivated by the fact that, from 2008
on, the minimum fees set by the national council of lawyers are no longer considered as compulsory, in light
of the above discussed decree 223/2006. Moreover, 2008 data are not available.
21
Italian provinces correspond to the NUTS3 areas and are comparable in size to US counties.
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cultural, artistic and sportive no-profit associations, every 100,000 inhabitants at provincial
level in each year.
Our list of control variables is likely to be incomplete, since it is impossible to control for
all factors affecting civil litigation. Thus, to control for unobserved factors, we exploit the
panel structure of our dataset and we include both province- and year-fixed effects.
Detailed definitions and sources are presented for all of the variables in the Appendix.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, while Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among all dependent and explanatory variables. As already mentioned, the correlation
between lawyers and civil litigation is positive for all types of civil litigation considered.
Our main estimating equation is
litigationit = βlawyersit + γ 0 Xit + φi + φt + εit

(1)

where litigationit is the log of the civil litigation rates recorded by the civil courts in province
i during year t; lawyerit is the number of lawyers over population; Xit is a set of control
variables; φi and φt are province- and year-fixed effects; finally, εit is an error term.
The set of observables Xit comprises demographic and socioeconomic determinants of
civil litigation discussed and presented above.
OLS estimates on equation (1) are presented in table 3 and suggest that the different
measures of litigiosity are significantly correlated with the incidence of lawyers in the population.This relationship is overall robust across the different definitions of litigation rates and
even across alternative specifications of determinants and controls of civil litigation. According to these findings, a 10% increase in the number of lawyers over population is associated
with a 3% increase of total litigation rate, a 1.6% increase of litigation rate in civil courts of
justice, a 4% increase of litigation rate in front of honorary judges of peace and 5% increase
in litigation related to compensation.
Turning to the control variables, it emerges that GDP, employment rate and the number
of judges in the court do not exert a significant effect on local litigation rates. Our measure for education is negatively correlated to litigation rates, even if not always significant.
Population density is negatively and significantly correlated with our dependent variables,
while concentration index exerts a positive and significant effect on litigation rates. Finally
the level of social capital does not present consistent patterns and is sensitive to the type of
litigation rate considered.
However, there could be several reasons why the number of lawyers over population is
systematically correlated with litigiosity, some of which may not be adequately captured by
control variables. Therefore, identifying causality requires a source of exogenous variation in
the number of lawyers, an issue that we tackle in the next section.

5

Causality

Even after controlling for other determinants of litigation and for time and province fixed
effects, the number of lawyers across provinces could be correlated with the error term for
several reasons. As discussed in Section 3, the SID hypothesis implies that an increase in
the number of lawyers and, therefore, of the degree of competition among legal professionals,
could lead lawyers to exploit their informational advantage to induce clients to demand legal
services and to access courts even when that would not be necessary or effective. In Section 3,
however, we have already mentioned an alternative explanation that may potentially explain
17
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a statistical relation between the number of lawyers and the litigation rate. In fact, it is in
theory possible that the local higher rate of civil litigation in a court had attracted lawyers
to that area, in the attempt to serve a share of the high demand.

5.1

Methodology

In order to address the endogeneity issue we need some variable that is a good measure of the
number of lawyers in a court but is exogenous to changes in the local litigation rates. Here
we consider two instrumental variables. The first is based on the “fixed coefficient” approach
and uses national levels of lawyers and lagged values of the local distribution of lawyers across
provinces. The second instrument, based on the methodology proposed by Card (1993), uses
the average proximity of the province to the three closest law schools.
The idea (and name) for the fixed coefficient approach comes from Freeman (1980), where
the author empirically assessed the ability of the fixed coefficient “manpower requirements”
model to explain future changes in employment. Following Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz
(1992), Bound and Holzer (2000), Card (2001), Gould et al. (2002) and Cortes (2008), our
first instrument (predicted lawyers) builds on the interaction between two sources of variation,
which are exogenous to changes in local markets for lawyers: the initial distribution of lawyers
across provinces and the trend, at a national level, in the number of lawyers.
Formally, the instrument for the number of lawyers in province i and year t is defined as
a province-specific weighted average of national lawyers:
\ it = ω̄iT ∗ lawyert
lawyer

(2)

\ it is the predicted number of lawyers in province i and periodt, lawyert is the
where lawyer
national number of lawyer in year t and ωit is the share of lawyers in province i over the total
national number of lawyers in some base year T . In details, for each province i, we compute
the provincial share of lawyer in some base year T as:
lawyeriT
lawyeriT
ωiT = P
=
lawyerT
lawyer
iT
i

(3)

In other words, the provincial share of lawyers in province i and some base year T indicates
the percentage of lawyers residing in province i over the national number of lawyer in some
base year T .
One concern is that the initial distribution of lawyers across provinces may reflect expected
changes in the local litigation rate. To lessen any fear that the initial provincial share of
lawyers is itself endogenous, we use the 1992 provincial distribution instead of the 2000 one.
Moreover, as robustness checks, we use as initial provincial shares of lawyers, the distribution
across provinces in subsequent years: 1993, 1994 and 1995.
The above instrument is exogenous with respect to local litigation rates if both its components are exogenous. As already mentioned, the provincial shares of lawyers in the base year
T (ω̄iT ) is exogenous because measured in a period T preceding the time span to which our
data on litigation refer. On the other hand, the national trend in the number of lawyers are
mainly driven by demand for lawyers at a national level, and is therefore sufficiently exogenous to provincial changes in the local markets for lawyers. This predicted measure conveys
the number of lawyers in each province that would have been observed if the distribution of
lawyers across provinces had not changed since period T .
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We also consider a second instrument (proximity) capturing the presence of law schools
accessible from a province, as this could clearly be related to the individual choice of subject
at university. Following Card (1993), we use as an instrument for the number of lawyers the
provincial proximity to schools where to pursue a degree in law. In particular, the instrument
we use is the average proximity between the three closest universities offering a degree allowing
to obtain a qualification as a lawyer. The latter aspect is particularly relevant in Italy, since
not only the Faculties of Law but also the ones of Economics and Political Sciences may offer
degrees in law that allow student to go through the selection process to become a lawyer. As
a robustness check, we also consider the average proximity between the thee closest Faculties
of Law to a province.
The Italian university system has two peculiar features in favour of our instrument: i)
there is very low mobility of students across cities and universities;22 ii) since Italian universities, except rare exceptions, are public, and generally charge fees significantly lower than in
other European countries, the most relevant expense for university students are living and
travel costs. For this reason, the proximity of a law school may influence the choice of the
university subject by Italian students.
Formally, our instrument is:
1
IVit = 1 P
(4)
j dijt
3
wheredijt are the three distances with the closest law courses that allow to undertake the exam
to become lawyer. As discussed in Section 2, access to the legal profession in Italy requires
a five-year first degree in law, followed by a two-year apprenticeship in a lawyers office and a
successful exam for professional qualification, held once a year in each district of justice. For
this reason, we use the lagged proximity. In particular, we consider the localization of law
courses and law schools eight year before any corresponding data for the number of lawyers
and litigation rates. It is important to stress that our instrument is time variant for two
reasons: a) during the period considered new law schools or faculties have been set up and
b) new faculties have started offering courses in law.

5.2

Results

Once equipped with these instruments for lawyers, we proceed to analyze the effects on civil
litigation rates. Table 4 shows the results of our IV estimation that include province- and
year-fixed effect. The first stage regression confirms that our instruments fit well. Both
predicted lawyers and proximity are strongly significant and with the expected sign. IV
diagnostic shows the relevance of the instruments. The F-statistic of the regression is equal to
379.86, which is well above the lower bounds indicated by the literature on weak instruments
(see Bound and Holzer (2000) and Stock and Yogo (2002)). Moreover, the validity of our
instruments is confirmed by the Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions which fails to
reject the null hypothesis that the instrument are valid in all cases.
Overall, 2SLS estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the OLS
results. In particular, according to our IV estimates a 10% increase in the number of lawyers
over population is associated with a 3% increase of total litigation rate, a 1.6% increase of
litigation rate in civil courts of justice, a 4.5% increase of litigation rate in front of honorary
judges of peace and 6% increase in litigation related to compensation.
22
Makovec (2005) and Brunello and Cappellari (2008) document that three quarters of the university students in Italy attend a university degree in the same city where their parents live.
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As already mentioned, in order to test the robustness of our 2SLS estimates, we have
performed our IV regressions using as initial number of lawyers the distribution of lawyers
across provinces in subsequent years (1993, 1994 and 1995) and, instead of using the average
proximity from the three closest faculties offer a law degree, we have considered the average
proximity from the three closest Faculties of Law. Results (available on request from the
authors) are very robust to different specifications and the magnitude and the significance of
our coefficients have not been affected.
Overall, our results suggest that there is a causal effect of the number of lawyers on
the civil litigation rates. Therefore our estimates allow us to exclude the reverse causality
explanation and to support the SID hypothesis.

6

Robustness checks

In this section, we perform several alternative specifications designed to test the robustness
of our estimates.
A first possible objection may be related to the fact that our estimates may be picking
some spurious effects that are not attributable to the lawyers themselves, but to a systematic
change in the economic structure of professions in Italy. In particular, as already discussed
in the introduction, also professional accountants and business consultants have experienced
a significant increase over the last 15 years. Thus, in order to support or reject such an
objection, we re-run our regressions by using the number of professional accountants and
business consultants, rather than lawyers. The obtained results from such a regression,
presented in table 5, show that the effect of the number of professional accountants and
business consultants on civil litigation is not statistically different from zero, thus providing
no ground for the above objection.
Another possible objection could be related to the specific type of variables for the litigation rates used in our estimates. In particular, our empirical analysis focuses on litigation as
reflected in civil courts, and therefore completely disregard the number of proceedings pending in front of penal courts. Concerning this point, there is a crucial difference between civil
and penal cases in Italy. In fact, while a civil case may be started by any citizen, assisted by a
lawyer, and is therefore a natural candidate to test the SID hypothesis, a penal file have to be
started by a public prosecutor, thus leaving no room for inducement by lawyers. Therefore,
if we consider some measures of litigation in penal courts, we expect to see no effects exerted
by the number of lawyers. In our robustness check, we consider, for instance, three type of
very common property crimes: thefts, car thefts, bag snatches and murders. Our estimates,
presented in table 6, show that the number of lawyers in the court indeed does not exert any
significant effect on the number of penal files, thus giving further support to our results.
Finally, we add to our main specification the lagged length of first-instance trials as a
control, in order to test whether the expected length of the trial may affect the individual
decision to access to civil court. Our estimates, presented in table 7, confirm all main results
discussed above and show that the length of first-instance trials is negatively correlated to
litigation rates, although with a small effect.
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7

Conclusion

We have explored whether access to courts in Italy may be driven by the relative number
of lawyers active in the provincial courts of justice, in a typical supplier-induced demand
frame. We have collected data from different official sources and built an original dataset
on the 169 Italian courts of justice, considered in the period 2000-2007. Using panel data
estimation techniques, we have investigated the relationship between the local litigation rate
and access to the Italian courts of justice, and the number of lawyers officially active in the
courts. We have controlled, among others, for the number of magistrates in the court, major
economic and socio-demographic characteristics of population, levels of education and social
capital in the province. We have addressed the endogeneity issue by constructing two original
instrumental variables: the first, based on the fixed coefficient approach, uses national levels
of lawyers and lagged values of the local distribution of lawyers across provinces; the second
uses the average proximity of the province to the three closest law schools.
Our main result is that the number of lawyers operating in a court does exert a positive and
statistically significant effect on the litigation rate. A 10% increase in the number of lawyers
over population is associated with a 1.6% to 6% in litigation rates. This effect is robust across
several specifications and checks, both on the control variables and the instruments. Our
results thus support the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers. In particular, our evidence
supports the idea that, following an increase in their relative number, lawyers may exploit
their informational advantage to induce clients to access to courts even when litigation is
unnecessary or ineffective. Our results thus suggest that a share of the massive inflow of
new cases started in front of Italian civil courts of justice might be induced by lawyers under
an increased competitive pressure. It would be interesting to check whether the number
of lawyers operating in a court of justice could have also affected the length of the civil
proceedings. This is indeed the aim of our current research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Total litigation
Civil courts
Judges of peace
Compensation
Lawyers
Judges
Accountants
Density
Concentration
GDP
Employment
High school
Associations

obs.

mean

std. dev.

min

max

824
824
824
824
824
824
824
824
824
824
824
824
824

2.418
1.816
1.510
.597
1.656
.075
.616
246.027
47.376
18,121.36
44.751
.338
33.727

.450
.306
.705
.889
.697
.0264
.229
331.301
74.562
4,559.8
6.774
.039
16.340

1.464
.955
-.149
-1.215
.126
.024
.005
22.954
9.593
9,829.364
28.184
.257
7.75

4.200
2.734
4.078
3.664
6.995
.178
1.874
2,640.92
680.92
30,370.54
58.662
.485
104.73

Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables across the
103 Italian provinces during the period 2000-2007.
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Total litigation
1.0000
0.6211
0.9447
0.5072
0.5951
0.2808
0.1378
-0.4869
0.0779
-0.2140
1.0000
0.3798
0.4779
0.3701
0.1581
0.2994
-0.1165
0.1730
0.0659

Civil courts

1.0000
0.5197
0.5987
0.2573
0.0650
-0.5449
0.0342
-0.2611

Judges of peace

1.0000
0.6306
0.3106
0.1002
-0.5787
0.0324
-0.2393

Compensation

0.4018
0.2180
0.1380
-0.1669
0.3558
-0.1379

Lawyers

1.0000
0.2609
0.2096
-0.5022
0.0239
-0.1776

Judges

1.0000
0.3458
0.1856
0.0231
0.0179

Density

1.0000
0.1891
0.0745
0.3954

Concentration

1.0000
0.0188
0.4713

GDP

1.0000
-0.1482

High school

1.0000

Associations

Note: This table reports the correlation matrix between the dependent and explanatory variables across the 103 Italian provinces during the period
2000-2007.

Total litigation
Civil courts
Judges of peace
Lawyers
Judges
Density
Concentration
GDP
High school
Associations

Table 2: Correlation matrix
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824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

(.0812)

(.0866)

824
103
Yes
Yes

(.1029)

Judges of peace
(3)
.4032∗∗∗

824
103
Yes
Yes

(.1229)

Compensation
(4)
.5097∗∗∗

.0034∗
(.0018)

.0050∗∗
(.0019)

(.0010)

.0067∗
(.0039)

(.0013)

.0128∗∗
(.0050)

824
103
Yes
Yes

-.0011

-.0030∗∗

824
103
Yes
Yes

.0060
(.0042)

.0080
(.0050)

(1.00e-05)

(.9250)

(1.0468)

(.00002)

-2.6510∗∗∗

-1.9723∗

7.00e-06

(.7016)

(.9592)

.00002

-.2233

(.0818)

Civil courts
(6)
.1616∗∗

-.2789

(.0905)

Total litigation rate
(5)
.2880∗∗∗

824
103
Yes
Yes

(.0080)

.0206∗∗∗

(.0020)

-.0051∗∗

(.0071)

.0068

(.00002)

824
103
Yes
Yes

(.0107)

.0219∗∗

(.0018)

-.0052∗∗∗

(.0072)

.0066

(.00002)

(.0031)

.00002

.00004∗

-.0016

(1.3635)

-.7606

(.7949)

.8175

(.1318)

Compensation
(8)
.4887∗∗∗

(.0027)

.0031

(1.4594)

-1.9288

(1.2171)

-.0803

(.1121)

Judges of peace
(7)
.3907∗∗∗

Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000-2007. The
dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The variable lawyers is the
number of lawyers over province population. The sources of data for lawyers and civil litigation are Cassaforense (Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT,
respectively. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Province and year fixed-effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are
presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.

Obs.
Provinces
Prov. FE
Year FE

Concentration

Density

Employment

GDP per capita

Associations

High School

Judges

Lawyers

Civil courts
(2)
.1669∗∗

Total litigation rate
(1)
.2917∗∗∗

Table 3: Panel regressions: baseline
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Table 4: 2SLS Regressions

Panel A: First-stage
1.0032∗∗∗

Predicted lawyers

(.0419)

Proximity

0.0665

∗∗

(.0318)

F-test

Lawyers

379.86
Panel B: Second-stage
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace
(1)
(2)
(3)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
.3099
.1664
.4539∗∗∗

Judges
High school
Associations
GDP per capita
Employment
Density
Concentration

Hansen-J test
Obs.
Provinces
Prov. FE
Year FE

(.0858)

Compensation
(4)
.6086∗∗∗

(.0603)

(.0593)

(.1061)

-.2883

-.2253

-.1075

.7660

(.8780)

(.6473)

(1.1779)

(.7833)

-1.9449∗∗∗

-2.6451∗∗∗

-1.8499∗

-.6108

(.7262)

(.7085)

(.9987)

(.9066)

.0051∗∗∗

.0034∗∗

.0033

-.0011

(.0017)

(.0016)

(.0023)

(.0024)

.00002∗∗

7.00e-06

.00004∗∗∗

.00002

(1.00e-05)

(1.00e-05)

(1.00e-05)

(1.00e-05)

.0079∗

.0060

.0065

.0059

(.0041)

(.0039)

(.0053)

(.0051)

-.0029∗∗∗

-.0011

-.0050∗∗∗

-.0050∗∗∗

(.0007)

(.0007)

(.0010)

(.0011)

.0129∗∗∗

.0067∗∗

.0209∗∗∗

.0225∗∗∗

(.0034)

(.0032)

(.0043)

(.0056)

0.037
824
103
Yes
Yes

1.144
824
103
Yes
Yes

0.066
824
103
Yes
Yes

0.660
824
103
Yes
Yes

Note: The top panel of this table presents first-stage estimates of IV regressions. The bottom panel reports
the results of 2SLS (second-stage) estimates on on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian provinces
during the period 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded by the civil
courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. All control variables in Table 3 are always included,
both in the first and second stage. The sources of data for lawyers and civil litigation are Cassaforense
(Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The
F-statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the excluded instruments are jointly equal to
zero in the first stage. The Hansen J-test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square
under the null of instrument validity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and ***
denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance
level, respectively.
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Table 5: Robustness check: Professional accountants

Accountants
Judges
High School
Associations
GDP per capita
Employment
Density
Concentration

Obs.
Provinces
Prov. FE
Year FE

Total litigation rate
(1)
.1807

Civil courts
(2)
-.0512

Judges of peace
(3)
.3843

Compensation
(4)
.2770

(.2130)

(.2553)

(.2730)

(.3761)

-.2142

-.0860

-.1013

.8997

(.9958)

(.7016)

(1.2702)

(.8982)

-2.2325∗∗

-2.7624∗∗∗

-2.3822∗

-1.3471

(1.0226)

(.8898)

(1.4345)

(1.3787)

.0041∗∗

.0026

.0021

-.0031

(.0020)

(.0018)

(.0028)

(.0036)

.00002

9.00e-06

.00004∗

.00002

(.00002)

(1.00e-05)

(.00002)

(.00002)

.0091∗

.0065

.0084

.0086

(.0053)

(.0044)

(.0075)

(.0079)

-.0034∗

-.0014

-.0057∗∗

-.0058∗∗∗

(.0018)

(.0022)

(.0014)

(.0026)

.0123∗

.0066

.0194∗

.0203

(.0069)

(.0049)

(.0104)

(.0141)

824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian
provinces during the period 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded
by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The variable accountants is the number of
professional accountants over province population. The sources of data for accountants and civil litigation
are CNPADC (Professional Accountants Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All other variables
are defined in the Appendix. Province and year fixed-effects are included in all specifications. Robust
standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the
coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 6: Robustness check: Crime rates

Lawyers
Judges
High School
Associations
GDP per capita
Employment
Density
Concentration

Obs.
Provinces
Prov. FE
Year FE

Theft
(1)
.0654

Car theft
(2)
.1092

Bag snatch
(3)
.0619

Murder
(4)
-.0701

(.0410)

(.0936)

(.1156)

(.1561)

.1488

1.8552∗∗

.3145

.3577

(.4863)

(.8819)

(1.0840)

(2.1031)

1.5625∗

.1736

-.2640

4.1036∗

(.9415)

(2.1689)

(2.0220)

(2.4933)

.0002

.0007

-.0015

-.0018

(.0019)

(.0038)

(.0042)

(.0067)

8.81e-08

.00003

-6.00e-06

-1.00e-05

(1.00e-05)

(.00002)

(.00002)

(.00004)

.0030

.0055

.0045

.0072

(.0035)

(.0110)

(.0106)

(.0162)

.0015∗

.0023

-.0073∗∗

.0023

(.0008)

(.0014)

(.0032)

(.0020)

.0061∗

.0105∗

.0204∗∗∗

.0067

(.0034)

(.0057)

(.0055)

(.0092)

824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

824
103
Yes
Yes

Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations
for all 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the
log of crimes reported by the police over the total population, for each category of criminal
offense. The variable lawyers is the number of lawyers over province population. The sources
of data for lawyers and crime rates are Cassaforense (Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT,
respectively. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Province and year fixed-effects
are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%,
5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 7: Robustness check: First-instance proceedings lenght

Lawyers
Judges
Length−1
High school
Associations
GDP per capita
Employment
Density
Concentration

Obs.
Provinces
Prov. FE
Year FE

Total litigation rate
(1)
.2659∗∗∗

Civil courts
(2)
.2131∗∗∗

Judges of peace
(3)
.3201∗∗∗

Compensation
(4)
.4610∗∗∗

(.0847)

(.0776)

(.1094)

(.1382)

.2893

.1015

.6242

2.0735∗∗

(.9360)

(.6202)

(1.2203)

(.9764)

-.0001∗∗∗

-.0001∗∗∗

-.0001∗

-.00008

(.00004)

(.00005)

(.00007)

(.00009)

-1.1699

-2.0785∗∗

-1.1614

-.9974

(.9825)

(.8233)

(1.4890)

(1.3574)

.0054∗∗∗

.0030∗

.0046

-.0006

(.0020)

(.0016)

(.0029)

(.0031)

.00004∗∗

.00002

.00005∗

.00003

(.00002)

(.00002)

(.00002)

(.00003)

.0064

.0045

.0055

.0060

(.0051)

(.0043)

(.0076)

(.0074)

-.0027∗∗

-.0014

-.0044∗∗

-.0051∗∗∗

(.0013)

(.0011)

(.0020)

(.0018)

.0093∗∗

.0053∗

.0163∗∗

.0230∗∗

(.0043)

(.0028)

(.0079)

(.0098)

721
103
Yes
Yes

721
103
Yes
Yes

721
103
Yes
Yes

721
103
Yes
Yes

Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian
provinces during the period 2001-2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded
by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The variable lawyers is the number of
lawyers over province population. The sources of data for lawyers and crime rates are Cassaforense (Lawyer
Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Province and
year fixed-effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *,
** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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